Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
1

Introduction
Developed and well regulated financial markets are usually seen as a precondition for an efficient allocation of resources and can foster long term economic growth. On average, countries with better financial systems have experienced faster growth than those with less developed systems (King and Levine, 1993) . According to Levine and Zervos (1998) , developments in the bank and stock market are usually good predictors for subsequent output growth. Industrial sectors that are exposed to external finance expand faster in countries with more favourable financial markets (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) . This result holds independently of the nature of the financial system, i.e. whether it is dominated by banks or stock market based (Beck and Levine, 2002) .
The main argument for linking financial development to output growth is that developed financial systems perform critical functions to enhance the efficiency of intermediation by reducing information, transaction and monitoring costs (Levine, 2004) . Financial intermediation can allocate savings and resources to the most appropriate investment projects; boost the rate of technical progress by identifying entrepreneurs with best chances of successfully initiating new products and processes, monitor managers, promote sound corporate governance, provide insurances and sectoral and intertemporal pooling of risk. There is widespread agreement that countries should adopt appropriate macroeconomic policy measures, encourage competition in the financial sector, and develop a transparent institutional and legal framework for the financial system.
The law and finance literature emphasized the decisive role of the institutional framework for financial development and output growth, see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) . Since a suitable legal environment protects potential financiers against expropriation from entrepreneurs, it increases their willingness to surrender funds in exchange for securities and expands the size of financial markets. Two dimensions of the legal environment, legal rules and the quality of their enforcement are particularly striking. According to Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love (2002) stronger investor protection tends to decrease the cost of capital due to lower risk premia and could therefore accelerate the speed of capital accumulation. Beck and Levine (2004) argued that legal institutions are suitable to explain differences in the degree of financial development across countries to a large extent. Galindo and Micco (2004) concluded from their analysis that higher investor protection will reduce the elasticity of credit supply to shocks and hence the amplitude of the credit cycle. Following Boone, Breach, Friedman and Johnson (2000) measures of corporate governance, in particular the effectiveness of protection of minority shareholders are crucial to understand the extent of exchange rate depreciation and the decline of stock markets during the Asian crisis in 1997/98, even after controlling for macroeconomic determinants. See Wurgler (2000) for evidence that higher protection of minority investors can boost capital allocation.
Using a cross section of countries and industrial sectors, Perotti and Volpin (2007) found that competition and entry rates are positively correlated with investor protection in branches which depend more on external finance. Better formal protection, however, might not automatically improve the access to finance, as reforms can be captured by the current elites. Poor legal enforcement and unclear property rights limit the ability of individuals to raise funding (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) . Improvements in legal protection may harm incumbent entrepreneurs. By facilitating access to finance of new entrepreneurs, the rents of established firms decrease. As a consequence, incumbents will try to influence the political process to impede the respective reforms (Tommasino, 2006) . According to Herger, Hodler and Lobsinger (2008) institutions constraining the political elite from expropriating financiers could have a positive effect on capital markets. Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) argued that legal reforms can have a strong impact especially in transition economies.
Besides the legal system, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003) stressed the role of historical determinants for financial development in former colonies. Legal traditions, brought by colonizers, differ in terms of protecting private investor and creditor rights and have a long lasting impact on financial development. See also Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) on this point.
According to Girma and Shortland (2008) and Roe and Siegel (2011) (2007) reported evidence that the relation between bank sector development and GDP growth is actually negative, probably due to the low stage of financial development. While higher GDP growth has a positive impact on the stock market, it does not seem to promote banking activities (Ben Naceur, Cherif and Kandil, 2014) . This points to existing deficits in the intermediation function of banks. Furthermore, better institutions will promote financial development, but some institutions matter more than others. In particular, a better developed legal system can signal confidence and predictability.
To access the robustness of the institutional impact, this analysis distinguishes between financial development in the banking and stock market. In the MENA countries, these two segments of the financial market are positively, but not intimately connected. According to the panel analysis presented below institutional conditions are important to explain the development in both financial areas, even after controlling for macroeconomic determinants. For the banking sector, corruption seems to be the most important determinant in the institutional setting. For the stock market, corruption as well as law and order appear to be relevant. In contrast, bureaucracy matters only to a minor extent. Its effect is even negative for some of the stock market indicators. While per capita income and inflation do not seem to play a decisive role, openess to foreign trade is quite important for financial development, especially in the stock market. Overall, faster real economic integration is of key priority to improve the financial evolution. Better law and enforcement practices and anti corruption policies are strategies to accompany this process.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the financial environment in MENA countries by looking at the banks and stock market. Section 3 describes indicators for 4 financial development and institutions. Section 4 discusses the econometric approach and the results. Section 5 concludes with policy recommendations.
Banks and stock markets in MENA countries
Financial systems in MENA countries are dominated by banks and in some economies by state owned banks, despite recent privatization efforts. According to standard measures such as deposits held by the financial system or liquid liabilities to GDP, the size of the banking sector is quite large, compared to emerging markets in Latin America, Eastern Asia or Eastern Europe (Cihak, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen and Levine, 2012) 
Financial development and institutions
Since financial development is not directly available, it needs to be proxied by observable variables. However, the latter capture only specific dimensions of the overall phenomenon and will provide an incomplete picture. Therefore, different indicators are considered to assess the robustness of the results. The size of the banking sector is described by assets held by deposit money banks (ASSETS) and liquid liabilities (LIQUID), both expressed as a percentage of GDP. Bank assets refer to claims to the domestic nonfinancial sector, including governments, public firms and the private sector.
Liquid liabilities are currencies and interest bearing liabilities of bank and non bank financial intermediaries. To ensure stationarity all variables are expressed relative to the cross section average and expressed as a percentage of the latter, i.e.
(1) Dermiguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) and Ben Naceur and Ghazouani (2007). The index i denotes countries and t is time. The transformed variables constitute the ingredients of a 6 composite index. In particular, they are equally weighted to obtain an overall index for bank
To describe the stock market development, market capitalization (CAPITAL) is selected since it comprises the value of all companies which are listed at national bourses. Its ratio to GDP points to the ability to raise capital and provide risk diversification for the market participants.
Organized trade of domestic equities (TRADE) proxies stock market liquidity and is expressed relative to GDP. Rising liquidity might trigger higher investment of firms as it could allow a more efficient allocation of financial resources. TRADE is complemented by turnover (TURNO-VER) defined as the ratio of total domestic shares traded and market capitalization, i.e. trading relative to the market size. A small but very active market tends to have low capitalization rates but high turnover rates. An increase in turnover might be caused by a reduction of transaction costs, for example. Incorporating information from market capitalization, trade and turnover can provide a more comprehensive picture of stock market development than the individual series. Therefore, an aggregate index (STOCK) is constructed by the same approach applied to the banking sector.
The institutional conditions potentially affecting financial market development are reported by the International Country Risk Guide (PRS Group, 1998). Daude and Stein (2007) 
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Descriptive statistics for the original series are displayed in Table 1 for 1990 and 2007. Table 2 shows the correlations between variables within different groups. The statistics document a wide heterogeneity in financial development and institutional design across MENA countries.
For example, stock market capitalization to GDP ranges between 12.8 (Tunisia) and 204.2 (Jordan) in 2007. Because of the high standard deviations, the cross sectional means are not very informative. Nevertheless, the banking sector did not improve substantially in the period under study. For example, the credit to GDP ratio was 32.2 percent on average in 1990, and only slightly higher (37.2) in 2007. Despite the relative stagnation in the banking sector, stock market improved considerably, as witnessed by the various indicators. There may be some tendency towards less restrictive institutions, particularly in terms of law and order. On the other hand, corruption might have become more severe.
-Tables 1 and 2 about here-
While banking sector variables are highly interrelated, the correlation is lower for stock market and in particular for institutional indicators. The correlation between financial development and institutional quality appears to be sizeable for both financial segments. It is higher for the banking sector (0.57) than for the stock market (0.26). Although the banking sector and stock market are positively correlated (0.38), the strength of their relationship is far from perfect.
Note that correlation analysis does not imply any direction of the causal relationship. To obtain robust evidence, the subsequent analysis will be based on paneleconometric models.
Econometric specification and results
Empirical evidence for the institutional impact on the development of financial markets is based on the panel regression . While the banking sector regressions are exhibited in Table 3, Table 4 holds the results for the stock market. As a rule, only parameters with significance at least at the 0.1 level are reported 4 .
- Tables 3 and 4 about here-9 As a general finding, institutional conditions appear to be important to explain the development in the banking sector and the stock market, even after controlling for macroeconomic determinants and fixed effects. For the banking sector, corruption seems to be the most decisive determinant of the institutional framework. Apart from the liquidity to GDP ratio it is significant and correctly signed for all banking variables. Bureaucracy is also important for banking sector development, albeit its effect is limited to the willingness of providing credit. Law and order exerts a negative effect on the asset held of deposit banks. Thus, a higher degree of law and order will reduce the speed of asset accumulation. For the stock market, corruption as well as law and order appear to be relevant, while bureaucracy matters only to a minor extent.
Its effect is even negative for stock market liquidity. Hence, under a more bureaucratic regime, trade at bourses is expected to decline. While per capita income and inflation do not seem to play a vital role, openess to foreign trade is quite important for financial development, where the parameters are especially high in the stock market.
Conclusion
This paper explores the institutional determinants for financial development in the countries of the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. The institutional conditions are from the International Country Risk Guide. Paneleconometric techniques are applied to assess the development in the banking sector and the stock market. As a general finding, institutional conditions appear to be important in both financial segments, even after controlling for standard macroeconomic determinants and fixed effects. For the banking sector, corruption seems to be most decisive. For the stock market, the impact of corruption and law and order appear to be relevant. While per capita income and inflation do not seem to play a vital role, openess to foreign trade is quite important for all areas of financial development. Hence, Overall, faster real economic integration is of key policy priority to improve financial development as a condition for higher GDP growth. Better law and enforcement practices and anti corruption policies are strategies to accompany this process. 
